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This is a reaction to Borsboom’s (2006) discussion paper on the issue that psychology takes so little
notice of the modern developments in psychometrics, in particular, latent variable methods. Contrary to
Borsboom, it is argued that latent variables are summaries of interesting data properties, that construct
validationshouldinvolvestudyingnomologicalnetworks,thatpsychologicalresearchslowlybutdeﬁnitely
willincorporatelatentvariablemethods,andthattheroleofpsychometricsinpsychologyisthatofpartner,
not role model.
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Introduction
Borsboom (2006) addresses a topic that probably has occupied psychometricians’ minds for
quite some time: Why is it that psychology takes so little notice of the modern developments
in psychometrics? According to Borsboom, these developments are, in particular, latent variable
models such as item response models, conﬁrmatory factor models, and latent class models.
Borsboom suggests three causes for this lack of interest.
First, their operationalistic orientation leads psychologists to ignore multidimensional at-
tribute structures or nominal attributes as possible causes of test scores. Instead, psychological
attributes are equated with test scores such as the number-correct score. This results in assigning,
more or less habitually, the same properties to attributes than to test scores. An example is the
linear ordering of individuals on a single dimension.
Second, their reliance on classical test theory prevents psychologists from seeing the dis-
tinction between observable variables and psychological attributes. This is due to the deﬁni-
tion of the true score as the expectation of an observable variable, the test score. Thus, re-
search is led in the direction of investigating reliability and validity of test scores and away
from studying relationships between psychological attributes and behavior elicited by the
test.
Third, psychologists have embraced the Popperian idea that theory is continuously un-
der construction, thus accepting beforehand that it cannot ever be fully determined what a
test measures. Thus, the process of construct validation (i.e., ﬁnding the meaning of a test
score) becomes an enterprise that is always underway, and the discouraging thought of end-
lessly investigating the meaning of measurement is often taken as an excuse for not trying at
all.
Borsboom’s way out of this dead-end street is to be found in latent variable modeling.
Although I think that the propagation of latent variable methods will stimulate the construction of
better instruments, I do have four critical comments. They concern the status of statistical latent
variables relative to psychological attributes, construct validation, the state of psychological
research, and the role of psychometrics in psychology.
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Latent Variables and Psychological Attributes
Like Borsboom, I believe that the widespread use of latent variable models will stimulate
researchers to think about:
(1) the possibility that their attributes may be multidimensional rather than unidimensional,
and that an attribute may be represented by nominal categories rather than a continuum;
(2) the distinction between observable item scores and latent traits, factors, and latent classes
so that more thought is given to the causes of item responses; and
(3) using item response models with restrictions on the item parameters, cognitive diagno-
sis models that combine features of multidimensional item response models with such
restrictions, and latent class regression models and other latent class structures to better
understand what tests measure.
Unlike Borsboom, however, I think that latent variables—latent traits, factors, and latent
classes—are summaries of the data and nothing more, and that, compared to Borsboom’s am-
bitions, this seriously limits the possibilities of latent variable models. Let me explain my point
of view. Suppose a psychologist uses 20 items for measuring the attribute of inductive rea-
soning, an attribute that is at the heart of the intelligence construct. He hypothesizes that the
items elicit responses based on the same cognitive mechanism; that a higher level of inductive
reasoning (or, similarly, a better degree of functioning of the cognitive mechanism that is la-
beled inductive reasoning) increases the likelihood that a respondent solves the items correctly;
and that the attempts to solve an item do not in any way affect the probability that subsequent
items are solved correctly. In Borsboom’s and my perfect worlds, the researcher puts his hy-
potheses to the test by means of a unidimensional, monotone, locally independent item response
model.
This is where the strength of latent variable models resides, as far as I am concerned: in
the possibility to test the assumptions of the models through their observable consequences.
Classical test theory does not provide the researcher with the means to do this and leaves him
with “measurement by ﬁat.” However, the possibility of testing of a model for the data—indeed
a mighty weapon—is also where the strength of these models ends. The latent trait in an item
response model is a mathematical summary of variation in the data between cases. Its direct
meaning derives from a mathematical model, not a psychological theory, and it is estimated from
the data, not the cognitive processes behind the data. The best that can happen, indeed, is that the
item response model ﬁts the data, which may then be taken as support for the hypothesis that the
test is driven by inductive reasoning.
I use the word “support,” not “proof,” because there always remains a “gap” between ﬁtting
a model to data and the ﬁnal piece of evidence that the test indeed is driven by the hypothesized
attribute. This gap can only be “crossed” by inference or human judgment, and the hypothesis or
the theory becomes more likely the more evidence is collected in their support. However, there is
no way in which it can be decided that at a certain point the evidence is complete, other than that
different researchers of good reputation agree that it does (Hofstee, 1980). How might additional
evidence look in our inductive reasoning example?
It might have the form of other tests for inductive reasoning that use a different kind of item,
yet be hypothesized to elicit the same or nearly the same cognitive processes as the previous
test. Different cognitive skills or item properties might be distinguished using the new test(s),
and a componential item response model (e.g., De Boeck & Wilson, 2004)—actually, akin to
a nonlinear regression model—might be ﬁtted to new data. Both the ﬁt and the misﬁt of such
models can contribute valuable knowledge to theory formation for inductive reasoning. A new
set of items may give rise to another—that is, not exactly the same as the ﬁrst—latent trait or even
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skills or to let different item properties exercise their inﬂuence on cognitive processes. This need
not worry anyone, as long as one sees latent variables as tools for summarizing data, not entities
independent of the data on which they are ﬁtted. My conclusion is that statistical latent variables
help describe variation in data that is consistent with a putative psychological attribute; but, in
isolation, goodness of ﬁt of a latent variable model to data does not illuminate the existence or
functioning of the attribute.
Construct Validation
Based on the assumptions that psychological attributes exist and exercise a causal inﬂuence
onitemresponsesandthatlatentvariablesrepresentpsychologicalattributes,Borsboomproposes
to limit the process of construct validation to latent variable modeling of item response data alone
and discard studying relationships with other variables in a nomological network. I just explained
that I disagree with the second assumption; below I will comment on the ﬁrst.
The ﬁrst assumption boils down to a conception of construct validation that entails the use
of a substantive theory about the attribute of interest for predicting the pattern of responses to
a set of items and, reversely, using latent variable modeling of these responses for establishing
construct validity as a property of a test (Borsboom, 2006; Borsboom, Mellenbergh, & Van
Heerden, 2004). This conception excludes tests for the vast majority of psychological attributes
that are not supported by the kind of detailed and established theory that Borsboom seems to
have in mind. For these attributes the “theory” will make inaccurate predictions and, as a result,
the latent variable model will not ﬁt. But what will one do next?
Taking substantive theory as a starting point for test construction is an excellent idea that
has existed for a long time but is not widely practiced. The reason probably is that much theory
is still in its puberty, infancy, or even at the fetal stage. Given this state of affairs one often has
no other choice than to cling onto about every piece of evidence available in learning about test
validity, including relationships with other interesting variables. There is no reason to exclude
well-developed theories about attributes and their tests. For example, transitive reasoning is an
example of a theoretically well-developed attribute (Bouwmeester, 2005), but its relationship
with several verbal abilities may be interesting in its own right. Such studies are justiﬁed when
different researchers of good reputation disagree about this relationship, and may shed more light
on transitive reasoning but also, perhaps unexpectedly, on verbal intelligence.
Borsboom’s assumption about the ontology and causality of psychological attributes seems
to lead to a very restrictive conception of the process of construct validation: Elegant in its rigor
but impractical for psychology (and many others areas). It seems to me that we still know so
little about the functioning of the human brain in general and cognitive processes including those
underlying personality traits and attitudes in particular, that it is difﬁcult even to say what an
“attribute” is. In the absence of such knowledge, I prefer to consider psychological attributes as
organizational principles with respect to behavior. Thus, my point of view is that psychological
attributes deﬁne which behaviors hang together well and are useful to the degree in which tests
sampling these behaviors play a role in predicting interesting psychological phenomena.
The State of Psychological Research: A Case Study
In his own words, Borsboom sketches a grim picture of psychological academic research.
I agree that occasionally psychologists are capable of wild adventures but not unlike any breed
of academicians—including those involved in psychometrics, I would like to add. However, I
believe psychology is in a better state than Borsboom suggests. I also think that psychometrics454 PSYCHOMETRIKA
has much help to offer, but perhaps less spectacularly than Borsboom would hope for. Here is
what I see in present-day test and questionnaire construction.
At the time of writing this reaction, I was involved in several projects together with re-
searchersfromeducation,psychology,marketing,andmedicine.Eachofthemusesquestionnaires
to measure an attribute: attitude toward homework and study (education), self-concealment (i.e.,
keeping things secret from others; psychology), service-quality (of computer helpdesks and
restaurants; marketing), and perceived educational climate in Dutch hospitals (medicine). Each
of the researchers is trying hard to work with a good deﬁnition of the attribute of interest that is
well founded in the relevant literature; to ﬁnd a useful operationalization of the attribute into a set
of items; to be aware of item wording, use of both positive and negative item phrasing, and the
threat of response sets; and to think about the composition of the sample and the way in which the
data should be collected. They all use item response models or other modern statistical methods,
such as latent class models and multilevel models. Of course, they do many of these things acting
on my advice but what counts is that they are motivated and will carry on their knowledge to
others. Thus there is progress which, however, proceeds slowly.
I have to admit that it is difﬁcult to explain to my colleagues why latent variable models
are better methods than Cronbach’s alpha, the item-rest correlation, and principal components
analysis. After all, what item response theory does is model the dimensionality of one’s data and
represent persons and items on a scale, but isn’t this exactly what principal components analysis
and classical test theory also do? A psychometrician shakes his head in disbelief about so much
naivety but a psychological researcher who has not been trained to see the difference thinks
this is “much ado about nothing.” An effective recipe to make people see the—admittedly often
subtle—differences is to do the classical and modern analyses next to one another and report
both. For example, what convinced my fellow researchers to use Mokken scale analysis was
that it allows the investigation of dimensionality by means of user-friendly software and without
the artifacts of principal components analysis and factor analysis caused by discrepancies in
the frequency distributions of the item scores. Notice these are practical arguments. Given these
experiences,Ithinkthatresearchersfromsubstantivedisciplineswillacceptmodernpsychometric
methods if they are convinced of their practical advantages over classical methods and if results
can be obtained without much trouble (which could mean including a psychometrician in the
project).
The Role of Psychometrics in Psychological Research
Borsboom spurs his fellow psychometricians to take the lead in psychological research and
use their latent variable models as blueprints for psychological measurement devices. This is
motivated by the lack of ﬁne-grained psychological theories that deﬁne exactly what a particular
attribute stands for in terms of cognitive processes and functions, and how it should be opera-
tionalized in terms of items. The question then is whether in the absence of substantive theory
an “empty” statistical model can ﬁll the void and determine how attributes are measured. For
example, unidimensionality, monotonicity, and local independence are necessary to have at least
an ordinal scale, but they do not imply the kinds of tasks and data psychologists may ﬁnd ideal
for the assessment of a particular attribute.
As I see it psychometrics cannot replace substantive theorizing about intelligence and
personality for designing good measurement instruments; it can only provide support. To learn
about intelligence and personality, more and more research has to be done in the best traditions of
theseﬁelds.Goodsubstantivetheoriesarethebasisforgoodoperationalizationsandmeasurement
procedures. The role of psychometricians is to make researchers more aware of the importance
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of the population and corresponding stratiﬁcation of the sample, and the pitfalls in designing
a test or questionnaire. Important additional questions, several mentioned by Borsboom, are:
Do I expect a unidimensional or a multidimensional latent structure underlying the data? Are
dimensions continuous are categorical? Should the items be questions, statements, tasks, games,
or assignments? Should responses be oral, in writing, or sensomotoric? Should the data be
correct/incorrect scores, ordered rating scale scores, category membership scores, or response
times? Such choices determine which method should be used for data analysis.
Borsboom’s approach is different in that he would take a psychometric model as point of
departure and say: For a measurement instrument to have these particular properties, this is how
your test should look like and these are the kinds of data you have to collect. It looks as though
this view is somewhat at odds with Borsboom et al. (2004) who posit a substantive theory as
point of departure. However, given that they assume an ontological status for the attribute and
assume that a latent variable represents an attribute (also, Borsboom, 2006), it follows that latent
variable models indeed provide blueprints for theory about attributes.
Instead of blueprints for theory, I see latent variable models as tools for analyzing data.
They perform best, like any statistical method, when the data result from a well-established
substantive theory. Nothing beats a good theory: if one knows which strings to pull, the expected
data structure will stand out clearly and statistical analysis will be simple. Test construction
should always be based on substantive theory, no matter how primitive, because only then does
one know what one is looking for by means of statistical analysis, and only then can expectations
be refuted or supported. Absence of theory leads to data beset with many weak signals and an
overdose of noise, and the outcome of data analysis depends to a high degree on the statistical
model used instead of substantive theory. Alternatively, running many models will usually not
contribute greatly to theory formation other than, for example: “It looks like your data are
primarily unidimensional but this may depend largely on the items you used.” Thus, the role
of psychometricians in psychological research is to be found in propagating the formation of
theory, the operationalization of the attribute, the construction of the test, and the choice of the
appropriate psychometric methods for analyzing the data, in that order.
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